diff --git a/cmd/csaf_checker/main.go b/cmd/csaf_checker/main.go
index 9fd0fa0..eafa9c8 100644
--- a/cmd/csaf_checker/main.go
+++ b/cmd/csaf_checker/main.go
@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ func (o *options) prepare() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// protectedAccess returns true if we have client certificates or
+// extra http headers configured.
+// This may be a wrong assumption, because the certs are not checked
+// for their domain and custom headers may have other purposes.
+func (o *options) protectedAccess() bool {
+	return len(o.clientCerts) > 0 || len(o.ExtraHeader) > 0
+}
+
 // writeJSON writes the JSON encoding of the given report to the given stream.
 // It returns nil, otherwise an error.
 func writeJSON(report *Report, w io.WriteCloser) error {
diff --git a/cmd/csaf_checker/processor.go b/cmd/csaf_checker/processor.go
index 38644c9..64f0db2 100644
--- a/cmd/csaf_checker/processor.go
+++ b/cmd/csaf_checker/processor.go
@@ -54,20 +54,24 @@ type processor struct {
 	keys           *crypto.KeyRing
 	labelChecker   *rolieLabelChecker
 
-	invalidAdvisories    topicMessages
-	badFilenames         topicMessages
-	badIntegrities       topicMessages
-	badPGPs              topicMessages
-	badSignatures        topicMessages
-	badProviderMetadata  topicMessages
-	badSecurity          topicMessages
-	badIndices           topicMessages
-	badChanges           topicMessages
-	badFolders           topicMessages
-	badWellknownMetadata topicMessages
-	badDNSPath           topicMessages
-	badDirListings       topicMessages
-	badROLIEfeed         topicMessages
+	invalidAdvisories      topicMessages
+	badFilenames           topicMessages
+	badIntegrities         topicMessages
+	badPGPs                topicMessages
+	badSignatures          topicMessages
+	badProviderMetadata    topicMessages
+	badSecurity            topicMessages
+	badIndices             topicMessages
+	badChanges             topicMessages
+	badFolders             topicMessages
+	badWellknownMetadata   topicMessages
+	badDNSPath             topicMessages
+	badDirListings         topicMessages
+	badROLIEFeed           topicMessages
+	badROLIEService        topicMessages
+	badROLIECategory       topicMessages
+	badWhitePermissions    topicMessages
+	badAmberRedPermissions topicMessages
 
 	expr *util.PathEval
 }
@@ -149,6 +153,19 @@ func (m *topicMessages) reset() { *m = nil }
 // used returns true if we have used this topic.
 func (m *topicMessages) used() bool { return *m != nil }
 
+// hasErrors checks if there are any error messages.
+func (m *topicMessages) hasErrors() bool {
+	if !m.used() {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, msg := range *m {
+		if msg.Type == ErrorType {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // newProcessor returns a processor structure after assigning the given options to the opts attribute
 // and initializing the "alreadyChecked" and "expr" fields.
 func newProcessor(opts *options) (*processor, error) {
@@ -220,7 +237,11 @@ func (p *processor) clean() {
 	p.badWellknownMetadata.reset()
 	p.badDNSPath.reset()
 	p.badDirListings.reset()
-	p.badROLIEfeed.reset()
+	p.badROLIEFeed.reset()
+	p.badROLIEService.reset()
+	p.badROLIECategory.reset()
+	p.badWhitePermissions.reset()
+	p.badAmberRedPermissions.reset()
 	p.labelChecker = nil
 }
 
@@ -254,10 +275,27 @@ func (p *processor) run(domains []string) (*Report, error) {
 			continue
 		}
 
-		for _, r := range buildReporters(*domain.Role) {
+		if domain.Role == nil {
+			log.Printf("No role found in meta data. Ignoring domain %q\n", d)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		rules := roleRequirements(*domain.Role)
+		// TODO: store error base on rules eval in report.
+		if rules == nil {
+			log.Printf(
+				"WARN: Cannot find requirement rules for role %q. Assuming trusted provider.\n",
+				*domain.Role)
+			rules = trustedProviderRules
+		}
+
+		// 18, 19, 20 should always be checked.
+		for _, r := range rules.reporters([]int{18, 19, 20}) {
 			r.report(p, domain)
 		}
 
+		domain.Passed = rules.eval(p)
+
 		report.Domains = append(report.Domains, domain)
 		p.clean()
 	}
@@ -369,12 +407,8 @@ func (p *processor) checkRedirect(r *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (p *processor) httpClient() util.Client {
-
-	if p.client != nil {
-		return p.client
-	}
-
+// fullClient returns a fully configure HTTP client.
+func (p *processor) fullClient() util.Client {
 	hClient := http.Client{}
 
 	hClient.CheckRedirect = p.checkRedirect
@@ -414,8 +448,29 @@ func (p *processor) httpClient() util.Client {
 			Limiter: rate.NewLimiter(rate.Limit(*p.opts.Rate), 1),
 		}
 	}
+	return client
+}
 
-	p.client = client
+// basicClient returns a http Client w/o certs and headers.
+func (p *processor) basicClient() *http.Client {
+	if p.opts.Insecure {
+		tr := &http.Transport{
+			TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
+		}
+		return &http.Client{Transport: tr}
+	}
+	return &http.Client{}
+}
+
+// httpClient returns a cached HTTP client to be used to
+// download remote ressources.
+func (p *processor) httpClient() util.Client {
+
+	if p.client != nil {
+		return p.client
+	}
+
+	p.client = p.fullClient()
 	return p.client
 }
 
@@ -655,11 +710,21 @@ func (p *processor) integrity(
 
 		// Extract the tlp level of the entry
 		if tlpa, err := p.expr.Eval(
-			`$.document.distribution`, doc); err != nil {
-			p.badROLIEfeed.error(
+			`$.document`, doc); err != nil {
+			p.badROLIEFeed.error(
 				"Extracting 'tlp level' from %s failed: %v", u, err)
 		} else {
 			tlpe := extractTLP(tlpa)
+			// If the client has no authorization it shouldn't be able
+			// to access TLP:AMBER or TLP:RED advisories
+			if !p.opts.protectedAccess() &&
+				(tlpe == csaf.TLPLabelAmber || tlpe == csaf.TLPLabelRed) {
+
+				p.badAmberRedPermissions.use()
+				p.badAmberRedPermissions.error(
+					"Advisory %s of TLP level %v is not access protected.",
+					u, tlpe)
+			}
 			// check if current feed has correct or all of their tlp levels entries.
 			if p.labelChecker != nil {
 				p.labelChecker.check(p, tlpe, u)
@@ -781,11 +846,15 @@ func (p *processor) integrity(
 // extractTLP tries to extract a valid TLP label from an advisory
 // Returns "UNLABELED" if it does not exist, the label otherwise
 func extractTLP(tlpa any) csaf.TLPLabel {
-	if distribution, ok := tlpa.(map[string]any); ok {
-		if tlp, ok := distribution["tlp"]; ok {
-			if label, ok := tlp.(map[string]any); ok {
-				if labelstring, ok := label["label"].(string); ok {
-					return csaf.TLPLabel(labelstring)
+	if document, ok := tlpa.(map[string]any); ok {
+		if distri, ok := document["distribution"]; ok {
+			if distribution, ok := distri.(map[string]any); ok {
+				if tlp, ok := distribution["tlp"]; ok {
+					if label, ok := tlp.(map[string]any); ok {
+						if labelstring, ok := label["label"].(string); ok {
+							return csaf.TLPLabel(labelstring)
+						}
+					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -979,6 +1048,8 @@ func (p *processor) checkCSAFs(_ string) error {
 				return err
 			}
 		}
+		// check for service category document
+		p.serviceCheck(feeds)
 	}
 
 	// No rolie feeds -> try directory_urls.
diff --git a/cmd/csaf_checker/report.go b/cmd/csaf_checker/report.go
index 269da00..07c8d9c 100644
--- a/cmd/csaf_checker/report.go
+++ b/cmd/csaf_checker/report.go
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ type Domain struct {
 	Publisher    *csaf.Publisher    `json:"publisher,omitempty"`
 	Role         *csaf.MetadataRole `json:"role,omitempty"`
 	Requirements []*Requirement     `json:"requirements,omitempty"`
+	Passed       bool               `json:"passed"`
 }
 
 // ReportTime stores the time of the report.
@@ -80,12 +81,7 @@ func (r *Requirement) Append(msgs []Message) {
 
 // HasErrors tells if this domain has errors.
 func (d *Domain) HasErrors() bool {
-	for _, r := range d.Requirements {
-		if r.HasErrors() {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
+	return !d.Passed
 }
 
 // String implements fmt.Stringer interface.
diff --git a/cmd/csaf_checker/reporters.go b/cmd/csaf_checker/reporters.go
index 493732e..dfafc6c 100644
--- a/cmd/csaf_checker/reporters.go
+++ b/cmd/csaf_checker/reporters.go
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/csaf-poc/csaf_distribution/v2/csaf"
 )
 
 type (
@@ -46,70 +44,30 @@ type (
 	mirrorReporter            struct{ baseReporter }
 )
 
-var reporters = [23]reporter{
-	&validReporter{baseReporter{num: 1, description: "Valid CSAF documents"}},
-	&filenameReporter{baseReporter{num: 2, description: "Filename"}},
-	&tlsReporter{baseReporter{num: 3, description: "TLS"}},
-	&tlpWhiteReporter{baseReporter{num: 4, description: "TLP:WHITE"}},
-	&tlpAmberRedReporter{baseReporter{num: 5, description: "TLP:AMBER and TLP:RED"}},
-	&redirectsReporter{baseReporter{num: 6, description: "Redirects"}},
-	&providerMetadataReport{baseReporter{num: 7, description: "provider-metadata.json"}},
-	&securityReporter{baseReporter{num: 8, description: "security.txt"}},
-	&wellknownMetadataReporter{baseReporter{num: 9, description: "/.well-known/csaf/provider-metadata.json"}},
-	&dnsPathReporter{baseReporter{num: 10, description: "DNS path"}},
-	&oneFolderPerYearReport{baseReporter{num: 11, description: "One folder per year"}},
-	&indexReporter{baseReporter{num: 12, description: "index.txt"}},
-	&changesReporter{baseReporter{num: 13, description: "changes.csv"}},
-	&directoryListingsReporter{baseReporter{num: 14, description: "Directory listings"}},
-	&rolieFeedReporter{baseReporter{num: 15, description: "ROLIE feed"}},
-	&rolieServiceReporter{baseReporter{num: 16, description: "ROLIE service document"}},
-	&rolieCategoryReporter{baseReporter{num: 17, description: "ROLIE category document"}},
-	&integrityReporter{baseReporter{num: 18, description: "Integrity"}},
-	&signaturesReporter{baseReporter{num: 19, description: "Signatures"}},
-	&publicPGPKeyReporter{baseReporter{num: 20, description: "Public OpenPGP Key"}},
-	&listReporter{baseReporter{num: 21, description: "List of CSAF providers"}},
-	&hasTwoReporter{baseReporter{num: 22, description: "Two disjoint issuing parties"}},
-	&mirrorReporter{baseReporter{num: 23, description: "Mirror"}},
-}
-
-var roleImplies = map[csaf.MetadataRole][]csaf.MetadataRole{
-	csaf.MetadataRoleProvider:        {csaf.MetadataRolePublisher},
-	csaf.MetadataRoleTrustedProvider: {csaf.MetadataRoleProvider},
-}
-
-func requirements(role csaf.MetadataRole) [][2]int {
-	var own [][2]int
-	switch role {
-	case csaf.MetadataRoleTrustedProvider:
-		own = [][2]int{{18, 20}}
-	case csaf.MetadataRoleProvider:
-		// TODO: use commented numbers when TLPs should be checked.
-		own = [][2]int{{6 /* 5 */, 7}, {8, 10}, {11, 14}, {15, 17}}
-	case csaf.MetadataRolePublisher:
-		own = [][2]int{{1, 3 /* 4 */}}
-	}
-	for _, base := range roleImplies[role] {
-		own = append(own, requirements(base)...)
-	}
-	return own
-}
-
-// buildReporters initializes each report by assigning a number and description to it.
-// It returns an array of the reporter interface type.
-func buildReporters(role csaf.MetadataRole) []reporter {
-	var reps []reporter
-	reqs := requirements(role)
-	// sort to have them ordered by there number.
-	sort.Slice(reqs, func(i, j int) bool { return reqs[i][0] < reqs[j][0] })
-	for _, req := range reqs {
-		from, to := req[0]-1, req[1]-1
-		for i := from; i <= to; i++ {
-			if rep := reporters[i]; rep != nil {
-				reps = append(reps, rep)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return reps
+var reporters = [...]reporter{
+	1:  &validReporter{baseReporter{num: 1, description: "Valid CSAF documents"}},
+	2:  &filenameReporter{baseReporter{num: 2, description: "Filename"}},
+	3:  &tlsReporter{baseReporter{num: 3, description: "TLS"}},
+	4:  &tlpWhiteReporter{baseReporter{num: 4, description: "TLP:WHITE"}},
+	5:  &tlpAmberRedReporter{baseReporter{num: 5, description: "TLP:AMBER and TLP:RED"}},
+	6:  &redirectsReporter{baseReporter{num: 6, description: "Redirects"}},
+	7:  &providerMetadataReport{baseReporter{num: 7, description: "provider-metadata.json"}},
+	8:  &securityReporter{baseReporter{num: 8, description: "security.txt"}},
+	9:  &wellknownMetadataReporter{baseReporter{num: 9, description: "/.well-known/csaf/provider-metadata.json"}},
+	10: &dnsPathReporter{baseReporter{num: 10, description: "DNS path"}},
+	11: &oneFolderPerYearReport{baseReporter{num: 11, description: "One folder per year"}},
+	12: &indexReporter{baseReporter{num: 12, description: "index.txt"}},
+	13: &changesReporter{baseReporter{num: 13, description: "changes.csv"}},
+	14: &directoryListingsReporter{baseReporter{num: 14, description: "Directory listings"}},
+	15: &rolieFeedReporter{baseReporter{num: 15, description: "ROLIE feed"}},
+	16: &rolieServiceReporter{baseReporter{num: 16, description: "ROLIE service document"}},
+	17: &rolieCategoryReporter{baseReporter{num: 17, description: "ROLIE category document"}},
+	18: &integrityReporter{baseReporter{num: 18, description: "Integrity"}},
+	19: &signaturesReporter{baseReporter{num: 19, description: "Signatures"}},
+	20: &publicPGPKeyReporter{baseReporter{num: 20, description: "Public OpenPGP Key"}},
+	21: &listReporter{baseReporter{num: 21, description: "List of CSAF providers"}},
+	22: &hasTwoReporter{baseReporter{num: 22, description: "Two disjoint issuing parties"}},
+	23: &mirrorReporter{baseReporter{num: 23, description: "Mirror"}},
 }
 
 func (bc *baseReporter) requirement(domain *Domain) *Requirement {
@@ -194,16 +152,34 @@ func (r *tlsReporter) report(p *processor, domain *Domain) {
 // report tests if a document labeled TLP:WHITE
 // is freely accessible and sets the "message" field value
 // of the "Requirement" struct as a result of that.
-func (r *tlpWhiteReporter) report(_ *processor, _ *Domain) {
-	// TODO
+func (r *tlpWhiteReporter) report(p *processor, domain *Domain) {
+	req := r.requirement(domain)
+	if !p.badWhitePermissions.used() {
+		req.message(InfoType, "No advisories labeled TLP:WHITE tested for accessibility.")
+		return
+	}
+	if len(p.badWhitePermissions) == 0 {
+		req.message(InfoType, "All advisories labeled TLP:WHITE were freely accessible.")
+		return
+	}
+	req.Messages = p.badWhitePermissions
 }
 
 // report tests if a document labeled TLP:AMBER
 // or TLP:RED is access protected
 // and sets the "message" field value
 // of the "Requirement" struct as a result of that.
-func (r *tlpAmberRedReporter) report(_ *processor, _ *Domain) {
-	// TODO
+func (r *tlpAmberRedReporter) report(p *processor, domain *Domain) {
+	req := r.requirement(domain)
+	if !p.badAmberRedPermissions.used() {
+		req.message(InfoType, "No advisories labeled TLP:AMBER or TLP:RED tested for accessibility.")
+		return
+	}
+	if len(p.badAmberRedPermissions) == 0 {
+		req.message(InfoType, "All tested advisories labeled TLP:WHITE or TLP:RED were access-protected.")
+		return
+	}
+	req.Messages = p.badAmberRedPermissions
 }
 
 // report tests if redirects are used and sets the "message" field value
@@ -366,23 +342,33 @@ func (r *directoryListingsReporter) report(p *processor, domain *Domain) {
 // of the "Requirement" struct as a result of that.
 func (r *rolieFeedReporter) report(p *processor, domain *Domain) {
 	req := r.requirement(domain)
-	if !p.badROLIEfeed.used() {
+	if !p.badROLIEFeed.used() {
 		req.message(InfoType, "No checks on the validity of ROLIE feeds performed.")
 		return
 	}
-	if len(p.badROLIEfeed) == 0 {
+	if len(p.badROLIEFeed) == 0 {
 		req.message(InfoType, "All checked ROLIE feeds validated fine.")
 		return
 	}
-	req.Messages = p.badROLIEfeed
+	req.Messages = p.badROLIEFeed
 }
 
 // report tests whether a ROLIE service document is used and if so,
 // whether it is a [RFC8322] conform JSON file that lists the
 // ROLIE feed documents and sets the "message" field value
 // of the "Requirement" struct as a result of that.
-func (r *rolieServiceReporter) report(_ *processor, _ *Domain) {
-	// TODO
+func (r *rolieServiceReporter) report(p *processor, domain *Domain) {
+	req := r.requirement(domain)
+	if !p.badROLIEService.used() {
+		req.message(InfoType, "ROLIE service document was not checked.")
+		return
+	}
+	if len(p.badROLIEService) == 0 {
+		req.message(InfoType, "ROLIE service document validated fine.")
+		return
+	}
+	req.Messages = p.badROLIEService
+
 }
 
 // report tests whether a ROLIE category document is used and if so,
@@ -390,8 +376,18 @@ func (r *rolieServiceReporter) report(_ *processor, _ *Domain) {
 // documents by certain criteria
 // and sets the "message" field value
 // of the "Requirement" struct as a result of that.
-func (r *rolieCategoryReporter) report(_ *processor, _ *Domain) {
-	// TODO
+func (r *rolieCategoryReporter) report(p *processor, domain *Domain) {
+	req := r.requirement(domain)
+	if !p.badROLIECategory.used() {
+		req.message(InfoType, "No checks on the existence of ROLIE category documents performed.")
+		return
+	}
+	if len(p.badROLIECategory) == 0 {
+		req.message(InfoType, "All checked ROLIE category documents exist.")
+		return
+	}
+	req.Messages = p.badROLIECategory
+
 }
 
 func (r *integrityReporter) report(p *processor, domain *Domain) {
diff --git a/cmd/csaf_checker/roliecheck.go b/cmd/csaf_checker/roliecheck.go
index 9dcdf11..fe217d6 100644
--- a/cmd/csaf_checker/roliecheck.go
+++ b/cmd/csaf_checker/roliecheck.go
@@ -9,7 +9,10 @@
 package main
 
 import (
+	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/csaf-poc/csaf_distribution/v2/csaf"
 	"github.com/csaf-poc/csaf_distribution/v2/util"
@@ -21,7 +24,8 @@ type rolieLabelChecker struct {
 	feedURL   string
 	feedLabel csaf.TLPLabel
 
-	advisories map[csaf.TLPLabel]map[string]struct{}
+	advisories map[csaf.TLPLabel]util.Set[string]
+	openClient util.Client
 }
 
 // tlpLevel returns an inclusion order of TLP colors.
@@ -65,21 +69,21 @@ func (ca *rolieLabelChecker) check(
 	// Associate advisory label to urls.
 	advs := ca.advisories[advisoryLabel]
 	if advs == nil {
-		advs = make(map[string]struct{})
+		advs = util.Set[string]{}
 		ca.advisories[advisoryLabel] = advs
 	}
-	advs[advisory] = struct{}{}
+	advs.Add(advisory)
 
 	// If entry shows up in feed of higher tlp level,
 	// give out info or warning
 	switch {
 	case advisoryRank < feedRank:
 		if advisoryRank == 0 { // All kinds of 'UNLABELED'
-			p.badROLIEfeed.info(
+			p.badROLIEFeed.info(
 				"Found unlabeled advisory %q in feed %q.",
 				advisory, ca.feedURL)
 		} else {
-			p.badROLIEfeed.warn(
+			p.badROLIEFeed.warn(
 				"Found advisory %q labled TLP:%s in feed %q (TLP:%s).",
 				advisory, advisoryLabel,
 				ca.feedURL, ca.feedLabel)
@@ -87,21 +91,57 @@ func (ca *rolieLabelChecker) check(
 
 	case advisoryRank > feedRank:
 		// Must not happen, give error
-		p.badROLIEfeed.error(
+		p.badROLIEFeed.error(
 			"%s of TLP level %s must not be listed in feed %s of TLP level %s",
 			advisory, advisoryLabel, ca.feedURL, ca.feedLabel)
 	}
+
+	// If we have an open client then the actual data was downloaded
+	// through an authorizing client.
+	if ca.openClient != nil {
+		switch {
+		// If we are checking WHITE and we have a test client
+		// and we get a status forbidden then the access is not open.
+		case ca.feedLabel == csaf.TLPLabelWhite:
+			p.badWhitePermissions.use()
+			res, err := ca.openClient.Get(advisory)
+			if err != nil {
+				p.badWhitePermissions.error(
+					"Unexpected Error %v when trying to fetch: %s", err, advisory)
+			} else if res.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden {
+				p.badWhitePermissions.error(
+					"Advisory %s of TLP level WHITE is access protected.", advisory)
+			}
+
+		// If we are checking AMBER or above we need to download
+		// the data again with the open client.
+		// If this does not result in status forbidden the
+		// server may be wrongly configured.
+		case ca.feedLabel >= csaf.TLPLabelAmber:
+			p.badAmberRedPermissions.use()
+			res, err := ca.openClient.Get(advisory)
+			if err != nil {
+				p.badAmberRedPermissions.error(
+					"Unexpected Error %v when trying to fetch: %s", err, advisory)
+			} else if res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
+				p.badAmberRedPermissions.error(
+					"Advisory %s of TLP level %v is not properly access protected.",
+					advisory, advisoryLabel)
+
+			}
+		}
+	}
 }
 
-// processROLIEFeeds goes through all ROLIE feeds and checks there
-// integriry and completeness.
+// processROLIEFeeds goes through all ROLIE feeds and checks their
+// integrity and completeness.
 func (p *processor) processROLIEFeeds(feeds [][]csaf.Feed) error {
 
 	base, err := url.Parse(p.pmdURL)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	p.badROLIEfeed.use()
+	p.badROLIEFeed.use()
 
 	advisories := map[*csaf.Feed][]csaf.AdvisoryFile{}
 
@@ -132,6 +172,10 @@ func (p *processor) processROLIEFeeds(feeds [][]csaf.Feed) error {
 		}
 	}
 
+	p.labelChecker = &rolieLabelChecker{
+		advisories: map[csaf.TLPLabel]util.Set[string]{},
+	}
+
 	// Phase 2: check for integrity.
 	for _, fs := range feeds {
 		for i := range fs {
@@ -158,13 +202,30 @@ func (p *processor) processROLIEFeeds(feeds [][]csaf.Feed) error {
 			}
 
 			label := tlpLabel(feed.TLPLabel)
-
-			p.labelChecker = &rolieLabelChecker{
-				feedURL:    feedURL.String(),
-				feedLabel:  label,
-				advisories: map[csaf.TLPLabel]map[string]struct{}{},
+			if err := p.categoryCheck(feedBase, label); err != nil {
+				if err != errContinue {
+					return err
+				}
 			}
 
+			p.labelChecker.feedURL = feedURL.String()
+			p.labelChecker.feedLabel = label
+
+			// If we are using an authorizing client
+			// we need an open client to check
+			// WHITE, AMBER and RED feeds.
+			var openClient util.Client
+			if (label == csaf.TLPLabelWhite || label >= csaf.TLPLabelAmber) &&
+				p.opts.protectedAccess() {
+				openClient = p.basicClient()
+			}
+			p.labelChecker.openClient = openClient
+
+			// TODO: Issue a warning if we want check AMBER+ without an
+			// authorizing client.
+
+			// TODO: Complete criteria for requirement 4.
+
 			if err := p.integrity(files, feedBase, rolieMask, p.badProviderMetadata.add); err != nil {
 				if err != errContinue {
 					return err
@@ -175,7 +236,7 @@ func (p *processor) processROLIEFeeds(feeds [][]csaf.Feed) error {
 
 	// Phase 3: Check for completeness.
 
-	hasSummary := map[csaf.TLPLabel]struct{}{}
+	hasSummary := util.Set[csaf.TLPLabel]{}
 
 	var (
 		hasUnlabeled = false
@@ -214,24 +275,25 @@ func (p *processor) processROLIEFeeds(feeds [][]csaf.Feed) error {
 			}
 
 			reference := p.labelChecker.advisories[label]
-			advisories := make(map[string]struct{}, len(reference))
+			advisories := make(util.Set[string], len(reference))
 
 			for _, adv := range files {
 				u, err := url.Parse(adv.URL())
 				if err != nil {
-					p.badProviderMetadata.error("Invalid URL %s in feed: %v.", *feed.URL, err)
+					p.badProviderMetadata.error(
+						"Invalid URL %s in feed: %v.", *feed.URL, err)
 					continue
 				}
 				advisories[makeAbs(u).String()] = struct{}{}
 			}
-			if containsAllKeys(reference, advisories) {
-				hasSummary[label] = struct{}{}
+			if advisories.ContainsAll(reference) {
+				hasSummary.Add(label)
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
 	if !hasWhite && !hasGreen && !hasUnlabeled {
-		p.badROLIEfeed.error(
+		p.badROLIEFeed.error(
 			"One ROLIE feed with a TLP:WHITE, TLP:GREEN or unlabeled tlp must exist, " +
 				"but none were found.")
 	}
@@ -244,8 +306,8 @@ func (p *processor) processROLIEFeeds(feeds [][]csaf.Feed) error {
 		csaf.TLPLabelAmber,
 		csaf.TLPLabelRed,
 	} {
-		if _, ok := hasSummary[label]; !ok && len(p.labelChecker.advisories[label]) > 0 {
-			p.badROLIEfeed.warn(
+		if !hasSummary.Contains(label) && len(p.labelChecker.advisories[label]) > 0 {
+			p.badROLIEFeed.warn(
 				"ROLIE feed for TLP:%s has no accessible listed feed covering all advisories.",
 				label)
 		}
@@ -254,12 +316,111 @@ func (p *processor) processROLIEFeeds(feeds [][]csaf.Feed) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// containsAllKeys returns if m2 contains all keys of m1.
-func containsAllKeys[K comparable, V any](m1, m2 map[K]V) bool {
-	for k := range m1 {
-		if _, ok := m2[k]; !ok {
-			return false
+// categoryCheck checks for the existence of a feeds ROLIE category document and if it does,
+// whether the category document contains distinguishing categories
+func (p *processor) categoryCheck(folderURL string, label csaf.TLPLabel) error {
+	labelname := strings.ToLower(string(label))
+	urlrc := folderURL + "category-" + labelname + ".json"
+
+	p.badROLIECategory.use()
+	client := p.httpClient()
+	res, err := client.Get(urlrc)
+	if err != nil {
+		p.badROLIECategory.error(
+			"Cannot fetch rolie category document %s: %v", urlrc, err)
+		return errContinue
+	}
+	if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		p.badROLIECategory.warn("Fetching %s failed. Status code %d (%s)",
+			urlrc, res.StatusCode, res.Status)
+		return errContinue
+	}
+	rolieCategory, err := func() (*csaf.ROLIECategoryDocument, error) {
+		defer res.Body.Close()
+		return csaf.LoadROLIECategoryDocument(res.Body)
+	}()
+
+	if err != nil {
+		p.badROLIECategory.error(
+			"Loading ROLIE category document %s failed: %v.", urlrc, err)
+		return errContinue
+	}
+	if len(rolieCategory.Categories.Category) == 0 {
+		p.badROLIECategory.warn(
+			"No distinguishing categories in ROLIE category document: %s", urlrc)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// serviceCheck checks if a ROLIE service document exists and if it does,
+// whether it contains all ROLIE feeds.
+func (p *processor) serviceCheck(feeds [][]csaf.Feed) error {
+	// service category document should be next to the pmd
+	pmdURL, err := url.Parse(p.pmdURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	baseURL, err := util.BaseURL(pmdURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	urls := baseURL + "service.json"
+
+	// load service document
+	p.badROLIEService.use()
+
+	client := p.httpClient()
+	res, err := client.Get(urls)
+	if err != nil {
+		p.badROLIEService.error(
+			"Cannot fetch rolie service document %s: %v", urls, err)
+		return errContinue
+	}
+	if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		p.badROLIEService.warn("Fetching %s failed. Status code %d (%s)",
+			urls, res.StatusCode, res.Status)
+		return errContinue
+	}
+
+	rolieService, err := func() (*csaf.ROLIEServiceDocument, error) {
+		defer res.Body.Close()
+		return csaf.LoadROLIEServiceDocument(res.Body)
+	}()
+
+	if err != nil {
+		p.badROLIEService.error(
+			"Loading ROLIE service document %s failed: %v.", urls, err)
+		return errContinue
+	}
+
+	// Build lists of all feeds in feeds and in the Service Document
+	var (
+		sfeeds = util.Set[string]{}
+		ffeeds = util.Set[string]{}
+	)
+	for _, col := range rolieService.Service.Workspace {
+		for _, fd := range col.Collection {
+			sfeeds.Add(fd.HRef)
 		}
 	}
-	return true
+	for _, r := range feeds {
+		for _, s := range r {
+			ffeeds.Add(string(*s.URL))
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Check if ROLIE Service Document contains exactly all ROLIE feeds
+	if m1 := sfeeds.Difference(ffeeds).Keys(); len(m1) != 0 {
+		sort.Strings(m1)
+		p.badROLIEService.error(
+			"The ROLIE service document %s contains nonexistent feed entries: %v", urls, m1)
+	}
+	if m2 := ffeeds.Difference(sfeeds).Keys(); len(m2) != 0 {
+		sort.Strings(m2)
+		p.badROLIEService.error(
+			"The ROLIE service document %s is missing feed entries: %v", urls, m2)
+	}
+
+	// TODO: Check conformity with RFC8322
+	return nil
 }
diff --git a/cmd/csaf_checker/rules.go b/cmd/csaf_checker/rules.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0899480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/csaf_checker/rules.go
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+// This file is Free Software under the MIT License
+// without warranty, see README.md and LICENSES/MIT.txt for details.
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) <https://www.bsi.bund.de>
+// Software-Engineering: 2023 Intevation GmbH <https://intevation.de>
+
+package main
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+
+	"github.com/csaf-poc/csaf_distribution/v2/csaf"
+)
+
+type ruleCondition int
+
+const (
+	condAll ruleCondition = iota
+	condOneOf
+)
+
+type requirementRules struct {
+	cond      ruleCondition
+	satisfies int
+	subs      []*requirementRules
+}
+
+var (
+	publisherRules = &requirementRules{
+		cond: condAll,
+		subs: ruleAtoms(1, 2, 3 /* 4 */),
+	}
+
+	providerRules = &requirementRules{
+		cond: condAll,
+		subs: []*requirementRules{
+			publisherRules,
+			{cond: condAll, subs: ruleAtoms(5, 6, 7)},
+			{cond: condOneOf, subs: ruleAtoms(8, 9, 10)},
+			{cond: condOneOf, subs: []*requirementRules{
+				{cond: condAll, subs: ruleAtoms(11, 12, 13, 14)},
+				{cond: condAll, subs: ruleAtoms(15, 16, 17)},
+			}},
+		},
+	}
+
+	trustedProviderRules = &requirementRules{
+		cond: condAll,
+		subs: []*requirementRules{
+			providerRules,
+			{cond: condAll, subs: ruleAtoms(18, 19, 20)},
+		},
+	}
+)
+
+// roleRequirements returns the rules for the given role.
+func roleRequirements(role csaf.MetadataRole) *requirementRules {
+	switch role {
+	case csaf.MetadataRoleTrustedProvider:
+		return trustedProviderRules
+	case csaf.MetadataRoleProvider:
+		return providerRules
+	case csaf.MetadataRolePublisher:
+		return publisherRules
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+// ruleAtoms is a helper function to build the leaves of
+// a rules tree.
+func ruleAtoms(nums ...int) []*requirementRules {
+	rules := make([]*requirementRules, len(nums))
+	for i, num := range nums {
+		rules[i] = &requirementRules{
+			cond:      condAll,
+			satisfies: num,
+		}
+	}
+	return rules
+}
+
+// reporters assembles a list of reporters needed for a given set
+// of rules. The given nums are mandatory.
+func (rules *requirementRules) reporters(nums []int) []reporter {
+	if rules == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	var recurse func(*requirementRules)
+	recurse = func(rules *requirementRules) {
+		if rules.satisfies != 0 {
+			// There should not be any dupes.
+			for _, n := range nums {
+				if n == rules.satisfies {
+					goto doRecurse
+				}
+			}
+			nums = append(nums, rules.satisfies)
+		}
+	doRecurse:
+		for _, sub := range rules.subs {
+			recurse(sub)
+		}
+	}
+	recurse(rules)
+
+	sort.Ints(nums)
+
+	reps := make([]reporter, len(nums))
+
+	for i, n := range nums {
+		reps[i] = reporters[n]
+	}
+	return reps
+}
+
+// eval evalutes a set of rules given a given processor state.
+func (rules *requirementRules) eval(p *processor) bool {
+	if rules == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	var recurse func(*requirementRules) bool
+
+	recurse = func(rules *requirementRules) bool {
+		if rules.satisfies != 0 {
+			return p.eval(rules.satisfies)
+		}
+		switch rules.cond {
+		case condAll:
+			for _, sub := range rules.subs {
+				if !recurse(sub) {
+					return false
+				}
+			}
+			return true
+		case condOneOf:
+			for _, sub := range rules.subs {
+				if recurse(sub) {
+					return true
+				}
+			}
+			return false
+		default:
+			panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected cond %v in eval", rules.cond))
+		}
+	}
+
+	return recurse(rules)
+}
+
+// eval evalutes the processing state for a given requirement.
+func (p *processor) eval(requirement int) bool {
+
+	switch requirement {
+	case 1:
+		return !p.invalidAdvisories.hasErrors()
+	case 2:
+		return !p.badFilenames.hasErrors()
+	case 3:
+		return len(p.noneTLS) == 0
+
+	case 5:
+		return !p.badAmberRedPermissions.hasErrors()
+	case 6:
+		return len(p.redirects) == 0
+	case 7:
+		return !p.badProviderMetadata.hasErrors()
+	case 8:
+		return !p.badSecurity.hasErrors()
+	case 9:
+		return !p.badWellknownMetadata.hasErrors()
+	case 10:
+		return !p.badDNSPath.hasErrors()
+
+	case 11:
+		return !p.badFolders.hasErrors()
+	case 12:
+		return !p.badIndices.hasErrors()
+	case 13:
+		return !p.badChanges.hasErrors()
+	case 14:
+		return !p.badDirListings.hasErrors()
+
+	case 15:
+		return !p.badROLIEFeed.hasErrors()
+	case 16:
+		return !p.badROLIEService.hasErrors()
+	case 17:
+		return !p.badROLIECategory.hasErrors()
+
+	case 18:
+		return !p.badIntegrities.hasErrors()
+	case 19:
+		return !p.badSignatures.hasErrors()
+	case 20:
+		return !p.badPGPs.hasErrors()
+	default:
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("evaluating unexpected requirement %d", requirement))
+	}
+}
diff --git a/docs/csaf_checker.md b/docs/csaf_checker.md
index e418813..30091e5 100644
--- a/docs/csaf_checker.md
+++ b/docs/csaf_checker.md
@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ The checker result is a success if no checks resulted in type 2, and a failure o
 The `role` given in the `provider-metadata.json` is not
 yet considered to change the overall result,
 see https://github.com/csaf-poc/csaf_distribution/issues/221 .
+
+If a provider hosts one or more advisories with a TLP level of AMBER or RED, then these advisories must be access protected.
+To check these advisories, authorization can be given via custom headers or certificates.
+The authorization method chosen needs to grant access to all advisories, as otherwise the
+checker will be unable to check the advisories it doesn't have permission for, falsifying the result.
diff --git a/util/set.go b/util/set.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0df693d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/set.go
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// This file is Free Software under the MIT License
+// without warranty, see README.md and LICENSES/MIT.txt for details.
+//
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) <https://www.bsi.bund.de>
+// Software-Engineering: 2023 Intevation GmbH <https://intevation.de>
+
+package util
+
+// Set is a simple set type.
+type Set[K comparable] map[K]struct{}
+
+// Contains returns if the set contains a given key or not.
+func (s Set[K]) Contains(k K) bool {
+	_, found := s[k]
+	return found
+}
+
+// Add adds a key to the set.
+func (s Set[K]) Add(k K) {
+	s[k] = struct{}{}
+}
+
+// Keys returns the keys of the set.
+func (s Set[K]) Keys() []K {
+	keys := make([]K, 0, len(s))
+	for k := range s {
+		keys = append(keys, k)
+	}
+	return keys
+}
+
+// Difference returns the differnce of two sets.
+func (s Set[K]) Difference(t Set[K]) Set[K] {
+	d := Set[K]{}
+	for k := range s {
+		if !t.Contains(k) {
+			d.Add(k)
+		}
+	}
+	return d
+}
+
+// ContainsAll returns true if all keys of a given set are in this set.
+func (s Set[K]) ContainsAll(t Set[K]) bool {
+	for k := range t {
+		if !s.Contains(k) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}